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‘EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW’ IN POLYETHNIC
SOCIETIES: THE CONTRUCTION OF NORMATIVE
CRIMINAL LAW STANDARDS*
Luke McNamara**
Abstract
Criminal justice decision-makers are routinely called upon to formulate and apply normative
standards — including adjudication on criminal responsibility, assessments as to the
availability of defences, and sentencing determinations. In polyethnic societies such as
Australia, the terms in which the relevant standard should be conceived is sometimes
challenged by defendants on the basis of their ethnic or religious identity. Such claims are
commonly regarded as giving rise to a ‘clash’ — between the objective of valuing and
respecting multiculturalism and pluralism, while adhering to ‘fundamental’ liberal principles
regarding equality before the law (universality, uniformity and neutrality).
This article examines a range of ‘diversity friendly’ theoretical perspectives with the aim of
revealing whether it is possible to overcome the ‘equality’ hurdle and the associated demands
for single and generally applicable normative standards. Drawing from the political
philosophy of liberal multiculturalism, legal pluralism, critical race theory and whiteness
studies, the theoretical limits of cultural diversity accommodation will be explored.
1. Framing the Multicultural Challenge to Legal Normativity
The emergence of multiculturalism as official Australian government policy in the
1970s was unquestionably an event of great significance, particularly in light of the
role that racism and cultural imperialism has played in Australia’s history. However,
three decades later, the imprint of multiculturalism on Australian laws and legal
institutions is decidedly faint. As Davidson has observed:
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Society Association, Vancouver, May 30 – June 1, 2002.
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It is not flippant to say that a multicultural Australia incorporated souvlaki and
dragon dances, but not the legal, political and ethical voices of its myriad NESB
newcomers. ... [I]n the realm of legal and political arrangements ... the
monocultural Anglo-Celtic past did not disappear when multiculturalism
became state policy in Australia.1
The ‘gap’2 between a polyethnic population and a monocultural legal system has
not gone unnoticed. For example, in the last twenty years the Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC) has undertaken two relevant major references, on The
Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law (1986)3 and Multiculturalism and the Law
(1992).4 In addition, a number of scholars have written on various aspects of the
law/cultural diversity relationship.5
The questions raised by this relationship are large and complex. What does
multiculturalism demand of the law and the legal system? Is the legal system sensitive
to cultural diversity? Should it be? Should the law reflect cultural diversity? Does it?
Should the law expressly protect distinctive and differentiated cultural rights?
However, the answers which judges, legislators and law reformers have provided to
date have tended to reflect a rather narrow and superficial interpretation of the
challenges posed by cultural diversity.
Diminution of the legal significance of multiculturalism is manifested in various
ways. At one end of the spectrum, law, and the ‘mainstream’ values and standards
that it embodies, are seen as outside the reach of multiculturalism. In this conservative
1 A Davidson, “Multiculturalism and Citizenship: Silencing the Migrant Voice” (1997) 18(2) Journal
of Intercultural Studies 77 at 77 & 82 (emphasis added). See also S Castles “Multicultural Citizenship:
A Response to the Dilemma of Globalisation and National Identity” (1997) 18(1) Journal of
Intercultural Studies 5.
2 A O’Donnell, “Thinking ‘Culture’ in Legal Education” (1996) 7(2) Legal Education Review 135.
3 Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law. Report No. 31
(Canberra: AGPS, 1986).
4 Australian Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law. Report No 57 (Canberra: AGPS,
1992).
5 Eg, G Bird (ed), Law in a Multicultural Australia (Melbourne: National Centre for Cross-Cultural
Studies in Law, 1991); S Garkawe, “The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the
Australian Legal System” (1995) 2 E Law-Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 29; S Bronitt
& K Amirthalingam, “Cultural Blindness: Criminal Law in Multicultural Australia” (1996) 21(2)
Alternative Law Journal 58; I Leader-Elliott, “Sex, Race and Provocation: In Defence of Stingel (1996)
20 Criminal Law Journal 72; S Yeo, “Sex, Ethnicity, Power of Self-Control and Provocation
Revisited” (1996) 18 Sydney Law Review 304; J Burley, “The Law and Multiculturalism: Problems
With Criminal Law Reform in the Vietnamese Community” (1996) 17 (1&2) Journal of Intercultural
Studies 69; D Stepniak, “Minority Values and the Reasonable Person of Torts” in M Chanock and L
Marks (eds), 50th Anniversary Conference of the Australasian Law Teachers’ Association—Cross
Currents: Internationalism, National Identity and Law (Melbourne: La Trobe University, 1996) p405;
and F. Bates, “Minority, Multiculturalism and Parenthood in Australian Family Law” (1992) 21 Anglo-
American Law Review 202.
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account of the law/diversity ‘clash’, the fundamental standards and norms of the law
are considered ‘off-limits’. Adjustment of these ‘core values’ with a view to
accommodating difference is not seriously contemplated or may even be vigorously
opposed as a threat to traditional ‘Australian’ values and an associated ‘way of life’.
More commonly, the starting point for considerations of multicultural law reform
is an acceptance that, in liberal democracies, the legal system does need to ‘come to
terms’ with the cultural diversity of the citizens which it is supposed to serve.
However, the parameters for any form of adjustment are firmly (and narrowly)
established by the ‘fundamental’ principles of equality before the law and
universality.6 As Sarat and Kearns have observed, (with reference to the United
States, but arguably with equal application to Australia):
Generally, color blindness, gender blindness, blindness to differences of sexual
preference—these have been the beacons of our law. Law has been unable or
unwilling to foster actively a society in which cultural pluralism and identity
politics could flourish.7
To the extent that it is considered desirable that the law should ‘reflect’ cultural
diversity, active law reform strategies are generally deemed to be unnecessary
because it is assumed that the organic nature of law, and its location within culture,
mean that ‘mainstream’ legal standards and norms will incrementally, but
inevitability, be transformed in response to the influences of cultural difference. For
example, Laster and Taylor have observed that:
shifts in our cultural values are mirrored in the law ... [and] Australian law
today reflects a growing acceptance that our society is multicultural and that
part of the function of law and legal institutions is to make multicultural social
policy ‘work’.8
This position resembles a view expressed by former judge, Sir James Gobbo, a decade
earlier when he suggested that in pursuit of “justice in a multicultural society” we
6 ALRC, supra note 4 at 10-14.
7 A Sarat and T Kearns, “Responding to the Demands of Difference: An Introduction” in A Sarat and
T Kearns (eds), Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law (1999) 1 at 11.
8 K Laster & V Taylor, “Law For Our Multicultural Society? No Worries” in H Selby (ed),
Tomorrow’s Law (Sydney: Federation Press, 1995) at 210 (emphasis added).
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should “place our faith in the common law. It is a deep, rich well — and it will tap the
riches of other cultures, for all deep wells interconnect.”9
An important consequence of this approach to multicultural law reform, and of the
conventional liberal democratic philosophy on which it is based, is that
multiculturalism in the context of the legal system has largely been seen as a
procedural matter. Indeed, law reform energies have primarily been directed at
facilitating access to the legal system and including the promotion of sensitive and
effective cross-cultural communication.10 In addition, a range of legislative measures
based on international human rights standards and the principle of non-discrimination
have been enacted.11 While of undoubted importance, such changes do not bring into
question the legitimacy of fundamental legal principles and standards for a culturally
diverse society. Procedural reforms of this sort often proceed on the assumption that
so long as access is provided in a manner which is sensitive to cultural diversity, the
legal system—and the rules, norms and values which are enforced within it—is more
than capable of dispensing justice to all parties regardless of identity.
The starting point for this article is the contention that the full implications of
cultural diversity for law and legal institutions in ‘post-colonial’ polyethnic countries
such as Australia12 have not been adequately articulated or taken seriously within
9 J Gobbo, Law in a Multicultural Society (Canberra: Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs,
1983) at 6. See also J Gobbo, “The Supreme Court” in Bird, supra note 5 at 29.
10See, ALRC, supra note 4; also K Laster & V Taylor, Interpreters and the Legal System (Sydney:
Federation Press, 1994); Mr Justice Brooke, “The Administration of Justice in a Multi-Cultural
Society” (1994) 1 Judicial Review 283; D. Eades (ed), Language in Evidence: Issues Confronting
Aboriginal and Multicultural Australia (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1995); J. Chan (ed), Proceedings of the
Symposium on Cross Cultural Issues in the Law (Sydney: Ethnic Affairs Commission of NSW, 1993);
M. D’Argaville, Cross-Cultural Communication Issues and Solutions in the Delivery of Legal Services
(Clayton: Monash University, 1991); Commonwealth of Australia, Access to Justice Advisory
Committee, Access to Justice: An Action Plan (Canberra: AGPS, 1994); and J. Stubbs et al, Cross
Cultural Awareness for the Judiciary (Sydney: University of Sydney, 1996).
11 Eg, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), Part 2.
On the impact of the Racial Discrimination Act see, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commissioner, Race Discrimination Commissioner, The Racial Discrimination Act: A Review
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996).
12 Debate over the implications of cultural diversity for Australian law has tended to follow two
sometimes parallel, but rarely intersecting tracks: claims based on ethnicity and claims based on
Aboriginality. The ALRC’s completion of separate references on The Recognition of Aboriginal
Customary Law and Multiculturalism and the Law follows this pattern which mirrors the government
policy ‘divide’ between Aboriginal affairs and immigration-related matters (see S. Castles & E. Vasta,
“Introduction: Multicultural or Multi-Racist Australia? in E. Vasta & S. Castles (eds), The Teeth Are
Smiling: The Persistence of Racism in Multicultural Australia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996) at 1.
While sensitive to the significance of the distinction (particularly from the point of view of many
Aboriginal people who object to the reduction of their distinctive claims to arguments for mere
minority status) the project will explore the conceptual common ground between the multicultural
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conventional legal discourse due to uncritical acceptance of such conventional legal
wisdoms as:
• the inviolability of fundamental principles such as “equality before the law” and
“universality”;
• the incompatibility of pluralism with the rule of law; and
• the amenability of ‘mainstream’ legal values to adjust ‘organically’ in response to
the cultural diversification of society.
This article approaches the task of finding the limits of multicultural law reform
by exposing these propositions to critical scrutiny, and by looking to a wider range of
philosophical and jurisprudential arguments for guidance. Are these ‘conventional
wisdoms’ valid and verifiable conclusions as to the nature of a democratic legal
system; or do they represent powerful myths which play an important role in
maintaining the existing cultural exclusivity and hegemony of the legal system?13 In
answering these questions this article examines the applicability of Homi Bhabha’s
depiction of the process of cultural difference ‘tension resolution’ as one whereby “a
transparent norm is constituted by the dominant culture which says that ‘these other
cultures are fine, but we must be able to locate them within out own grid”.14
The potential for principles such as “equality before the law”, “universality” and
“colour-blindness” to paradoxically perpetuate injustice in a culturally diverse society
will be examined. Support for this line of analysis, with specific reference to
normative criminal law standards, can be found in the observation of McHugh J, of
the High Court of Australia, that “Real equality before the law cannot exist when
ethnic or cultural minorities are convicted or acquitted of murder according to a
standard that reflects the values of the dominant class but does not reflect the values
of this minorities.”15
Such a judicial expression of doubt about the justice-yielding potential of the
Australian legal system’s ‘fundamental principles’ is rare. In the same case the
(ethnicity) law reform agenda and the Aboriginal rights agenda and will consider the practical
implications of areas of overlap as well as points of departure.
13 It should be acknowledged that the project is necessarily reformist in orientation. That is, it assumes
that it is possible and desirable to respond more justly to cultural diversity in the construction and
application of normative criminal law standards.
14 H. Bhabha, “The Third Space” in J. Rutherford (ed), Identity, Community, Culture, Difference
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990) 207 at 208.
15 Masciantonio v R (1995) 183 CLR 58 at 74.
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remaining six judges of the High Court of Australia reaffirmed the court’s previous
position16 rejecting the suggestion that the objective standard which is at the heart of
the criminal law defence of provocation should be shaped according to relevant
identity characteristics of the accused, including ethnicity.17 According to the court,
the “governing principles” of equality and individual responsibility demand that all
persons be held to a single standard.18 Similarly, in Walker v NSW 19 Mason CJ
rejected the Indigenous defendant’s assertion of the continuing operation of
Indigenous criminal laws and the non-applicability of NSW criminal law on the basis
that “It is a basic principle that all people should stand equal before the law. A
construction which results in different criminal sanctions applying to different persons
for the same conduct offends that basic principle”.20
Despite various necessary and valuable forms of legal accommodation and
recognition over the course of the last 20 years, the monocultural core of Australian
law has remained largely unchallenged and unaltered.21 This article attempts to
account for the apparent cultural “immunity” (and implicit cultural bias) of legal
values and standards, focusing on the political and philosophical foundations of
reform initiatives. To date law reform strategies have been developed on the basis of
liberal principles of cross-cultural access to justice and non-discrimination. The
article responds to the partial and problematic nature of conventional liberal responses
to the demands of cultural diversity and evaluates the potential of alternative
jurisprudential accounts of the law/culture/difference relationship to facilitate a
broadening of the debate over multicultural law reform to deal not only with issues of
access, cross-cultural communication and cultural sensitivity within the dominant
legal paradigm, but also with the processes by which ‘common’ legal values and
norms are constructed and legitimated in culturally diverse societies. Following Bird
16Stingel v R (1990) 171 CLR 312.
17 (1995) 183 CLR 58 at 66.
18 (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 326.
19 (1994) 69 ALJR 111 (High Court of Australia).
20 Ibid at 113.
21 This pattern is perhaps most significantly reflected in the approach adopted by the Australian Law
Reform Commission in its report on Multiculturalism and the Law, supra note 4. On the
imperviousness of Australian legal and political institutions to the implications of multiculturalism, see
A. Jamrozik et al, Social Change and Cultural Transformation in Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press, 1995); G. Bird, The Process of Law in Australia: Intercultural Perspectives (Sydney:
Butterworths, 2nd ed., 1993); Bird, supra note 5; Davidson, supra note 1; Castles, supra note 1; and
O’Donnell, supra note 2.
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and McDonell,22 this project challenges the conventional wisdom that judges (and
other decision-makers) “make decisions based on the ‘facts’ and their unbiased and
unproblematised versions of the values of the community”,23 and joins Bird and
McDonell in asking: “Who stands outside the vision of community the law constructs,
and what are the origins of the community values that the court seeks to reflect?”24
Part 2 of this article will briefly examine the manner in which the relationship
between polyethnicity, cultural diversity and normative criminal law standards was
approached by the Australian Lawn Reform Commission in its 1992 report on
Multiculturalism and the Law,25 to illustrate the conventional parameters which have
been set for multicultural law reform. Part 3 considers Will Kymlicka’s work on the
capacity of liberalism to accommodate multiculturalism in the form of differentiated
citizen rights, with an emphasis on the possible extrapolation of Kymlicka’s
philosophical principles to the context of criminal law reform and operation.26 The
insights offered by research and scholarship undertaken under the banner of legal
pluralism, will be considered in part 4. In part 5, the implications of recent insights
from critical race theory and “whiteness” studies will be considered, focusing on the
Angela Harris’ call for a “jurisprudence of reconstruction” in the context of normative
criminal law standards.27 Part 6 will draw together the article’s conclusions on
whether these diverse theoretical “friends of difference”28 can contribute to the
emergence of a counter-narrative of equality before the of law, which does not
automatically mute the claims of cultural minorities.
2. “One Set of Values”: The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Approach
22 Greta Bird and Mark McDonell, “Muslims in the Dock: A Transgressive Narrative of Law and
Life” (1997) 3(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/
ahric/ajhr/V3N2/ajhr3205.html>
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 ALRC, supra note 4.
26 W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995).
27 A. Harris, “The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction” (1994) 82 California Law Review 741.
28 A Sarat and R Berkowitz, “Disorderly Differences: Recognition, Accommodation, and American
Law” (1994) 6 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 285 at 289.
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In introducing the final report of its reference on “Multiculturalism and the Law”, the
Australian Law Reform Commission observed that “While cultural diversity is now
an accepted part of Australian society, the consequences of this for the legal system
have not yet been fully considered.”29 Through its work on the reference, the
Australian Law Reform Commission made an important contribution to the necessary
considerations. However, an examination of the Commission’s analysis, reasoning
and recommendations, reveals that it adopted a very familiar approach to resolution of
the problems associated with criminal justice administration in a polyethnic society:
removal of procedural barriers, enhanced cross-cultural awareness and faith in the
capacity of the legal standards to ‘evolve’ in line with the standards and values of the
society. Inevitably, this approach led the Australian Law Reform Commission to
conclude that normative standards in the criminal law should not be adjusted in
accordance with the ethnicity of the accused.30
The Commission’s take on the formulation and application of objective fault
elements is illustrative. Despite acknowledging that “there is concern in the
community about standards of behaviour and assessments of reasonableness being
devised and imposed from the perspective of the dominant culture”,31 the Commission
concluded that the such concerns could not justify abandonment of the single standard
approach:
Where reasonableness, negligence or recklessness is an element, however, the
determination is ultimately a value judgement ... Such a judgement can only be
made against one set of values. The Commission agrees that a proliferation of
different standards against which to judge the reasonableness or otherwise of a
person’s behaviour in the criminal law context is undesirable. To apply different
standards to different group would lessen the protection afforded to all by the
criminal.32
29 ALRC, supra note 4 at 9.
30 The Commission did recommend that “the offender’s cultural background should be specified as a
factor to be taken into account when the court is passing sentence”: ibid at 173.
31 Ibid at 187. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, Sinha has identified the concept of reasonableness as a
(potential) friend of cultural pluralism: “The most important quality of this doctrine of reasonableness
is that it can neither be reduced to a finite set of rules, nor can it be specified in terms of customs or
practices. Therefore, its open-endedness lends itself to the pluralistic use”: Surya Prakash Sinha, “Legal
Polycentricity” in Hanne Petsersen and Henrik Zahle, Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism
in Law (1995) 31 at 51.
32 ALRC, supra note 4 at 187.
9
To the extent that normative standards might need to change to ‘keep up’ with an
ethnically and culturally diverse population, the Commission endorsed the gradual
evolutionary approach:
... the standards of reasonableness against which behaviour is judged ... have
changed over time, and will continue to change, in response to changing social
conditions including the impact on Australian society of different cultures and
ethnic groups. A better result will be achieved of the standard is encouraged to
evolve to reflect the cultural diversity in the Australian community.33
The language in which the Commission chose to defend its status quo position
regarding objective criminal law standards (note the intriguing anthropomorphic
image of a standard being “encouraged” to change) effectively highlights the
deficiency of the ‘organic evolution’ theory of multicultural law reform. The preferred
policies and strategies for facilitating this evolution of criminal law standards are: (i) a
more ethnically diverse judiciary, magistracy, legal profession and police force; and
(ii) cultural awareness training for these and other criminal justice system decision-
makers.34 While these reforms are not without merit, it is not clear how they alone can
inspire confidence that normative standards will ‘naturally’ move towards reflecting
the cultural diversity of the population.35
A feature of the handling of multicultural challenges to the legitimacy of existing
criminal law standards and norms, which was also reflected in the Australian Law
Reform Commission’s approach, is to assume that the challenge is necessarily a
request for ‘special treatment’. In its examination of whether the criminal law should
recognise cultural difference, the Commission observed that “Tests of criminal
liability are there to determine whether or not a person should be punished for his or
her behaviour,” and posed as the critical question: “Does it promote the objectives of
criminal law to punish a person who has acted in conformity with cultural norms?”36
33 Ibid at 187.
34 Preference for this approach is well-established: see John McCorquodale, “Judicial Racism in
Australia? Aboriginals in Civil and Criminal Cases” in Kayleen M Hazlehurst (ed), Ivory Scales: Black
Australia and the Law (1987) at 31-32.
35 For example, even if the ethnic composition of the New South Wales magistracy was to reflect the
ethnic diversity of the state’s population, it by no means follows that a magistrate, whatever her/his
ethnic identity, would have the unique cultural understanding to deal with an application by the
accused that s/he be assessed with reference to a differential standard based on his/her ethnicity (say, in
the context of a bail application or a sentencing submission). In addition, there is the difficult of
developing cultural awareness programs that taken into account intra-group diversity: see Burley,
supra note 5 at 82.
36 ALRC, supra note 4 at 170-171.
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One might observe that the (initial) answer will depend on whether the “cultural
norms” in accordance with which the person has acted are the “cultural norms” which
are expressed via the relevant criminal law standards. This, in turn, begs the question:
how are the implicit cultural norms which underpin the criminal law determined?
When does a criminal justice decision-maker know when the claim being advanced by
a person whose criminal liability is being assessed involves a departure from
normative criminal law standards?
The Australian Law Reform Commission did not stop to consider these questions.
Instead it adopted the default characterisation of the challenge — that is, as a claim
for the application of a differential standard or “cultural defence”37 — and offered up
the corresponding default answer. Such claims, according to the Commission, must be
rejected because to countenance them would “violate the principles of equality before
the law and equal protection before the law.”38 The tendency to automatically
characterise claims based on ethnicity as a requests for differential treatment — that
is, with reference to a ‘special’ standard constructed around the accused’s ethnic or
ethno-religious identity — is evidence of the hegemony of the liberal discourse of
equality and universality. The fact that in specific cases a defendant may choose to
frame her/his claim in this way, further demonstrates the difficulty of confronting the
monoliths of neutrality and objectivity. And yet, claims based on cultural difference
need not be presented or received as claims for differential treatment. One might
characterise such claims as an attack on the legitimacy of dominant monocultural
norms and a demand for the endorsement of a representative normativity which is
genuinely responsive to the ethnic diversity of the society from which it derives it
status — one that is not coloured by whiteness. Of course, this would be no small
task, even if it was regarded as desirable. However, opening up the terms of the
debate on multicultural law reform is critical to moving beyond the ‘open and shut’
approach of the Australian Law Reform Commission.
Therefore, this paper will simultaneously investigate two rather different
approaches to the resolution of lingering dissatisfaction with the current application of
criminal law standards in a polyethnic society. If the Commission is right that the
existence and application of only “one set of values” is a necessary component of the
criminal justice system, is it desirable/feasible for decision-makers to adopt a
37 Ibid at 171.
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multicultural normativity or ‘non-white’ universality? Alternatively, do differential or
multiple normative standards which reflect ethnic diversity have a place in criminal
law decision-making processes, and if so, how might they be constructed and
deployed?
3. Liberalism and Differential Citizenship Rights: Implications for Criminal Law
Given that liberalism has, to a considerable extent, ‘underwritten’ the conventional
antagonisms within the criminal law towards the recognition of cultural diversity, it is
appropriate to begin this selected theoretical survey with a discussion of a notable
attempt to ‘liberate’ liberalism from the role of multiculturalism’s heavy-handed gate-
keeper. In a series of works published during the past decade (most notably,
Multicultural Citizenship39) Will Kymlicka has advanced a contemporary political
philosophy that has room for the recognition of differential rights based on ethnicity
or distinctive cultural identity. Kymlicka consciously sets out to defend liberalism
against claims that it is inadequate in accounting for modern community and culture,
and in so doing aims to show how liberalism can respond to the plurality of cultures.40
Kymlicka argues that minority rights are consistent with, and indeed promote
the liberal ideal of individual freedom.41 The essential interest of people is to develop
and live according to their beliefs, and it is the responsibility of the state to provide
the opportunity for this to occur.42 Individual freedom is said to encompass not only
the ability to pursue one’s “conception of the good life” but also to revise one’s views
on what constitutes the good life.43 The necessary preconditions, to be
provided/guaranteed by the state, are the provision of resources and liberties to
individuals, and the opportunity to experience and assess other views of the good
life.44 The membership of each individual in a community or communities is based on
one’s citizenship and also on one’s cultural membership, both of which are integral to
the individual’s pursuit of the good life.45 Integral to Kymlicka’s conception of
38 Ibid.
39 W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995).
40 W Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (1991) at 3.
41 Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 75 & Ch 5.
42 Kymlicka, supra note 40 at 13.
43 Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 80-81.
44 Ibid at 81-82.
45 Kymlicka, supra note 40 at 135.
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individual freedoms is the value of cultural membership, or “access to a cultural
structure”46 — something which an individual might reasonably be expected “to want,
whatever their more particular conception of good”.47
Kymlicka retains the notion of the individual as the central focus/paradigm of
liberalism, but notes that in multicultural and multinational societies, individuals do
not “stand in the same direct relationship to the state” but rather, do so “through
membership in one or other of the cultural communities”.48 Thus, the theoretical basis
of the relationship between the individual and the state is not universal incorporation,
but consociational.49 Liberal theory commonly underestimates or discounts the
independent value of cultural membership, focusing instead on the formal equality of
individuals as citizens. However, Kymlicka maintains that collective minority rights
are not inconsistent with liberal equality, that they can be reconciled.50 Such a
reconciliation is considered by Kymlicka to be vital to the survival of liberal theory as
politically and practically relevant in culturally diverse societies. Kymlicka also
acknowledges, as a matter of pragmatics, that minority rights would become more
politically secure if they were framed as an essential and integral element of
liberalism.51
Kymlicka argues that it is not enough for the state simply to provide common
rights of citizenship without further intervention to support and encourage cultural
diversity.52 The attitude of benign neglect – leaving the maintenance of cultural
diversity to the vagaries of the cultural marketplace – is rejected as mistaken and
incoherent, and as failing to recognise the decisions made by governments at a basic
level decisions which privilege the dominant culture.53 The cultural marketplace
favours the interests of the dominant culture and disadvantages the competing claims
of minorities. Thus, state intervention is justified within liberal theory to correct
46 Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 84.
47 Ibid at 86. This is based on various theorists who document the important role of cultural
membership in a person’s self-identity and self-esteem, and the bonds between language, culture and
identity: ibid at 88-90.
48 Kymlicka, supra note 40 at 137.
49 Ibid at 137.
50 Ibid at 152-3.
51 Ibid at 154.
52 Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 107.
53 Ibid at 108.
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inequalities which arise through no active choice of the group or individuals
concerned.54
An illustration used by Kymlicka in this context might be extrapolated (albeit,
somewhat creatively) to explore some connections between Kymlicka’s generalised
liberal theory of minority rights and the specific context of normative standards within
the criminal law. Kymlicka points to the correlation between Christianity and the
nomination of public holidays by government (in countries like Canada, the USA and
Australia):
In the major immigration countries, public holidays currently reflect the needs
of Christians. Hence government offices are closed on Sunday, and on the major
religious holidays (Easter, Christmas). This need not be seen as a deliberate
decision to promote Christianity and discriminate against other faiths (although
this was undoubtedly part of the original motivation). Decisions about
government holidays were made when there was far less religious diversity, and
people just took it for granted that the government work-week should
accommodate Christian beliefs about days of rest and religious celebration.
But these decisions can be a significant disadvantage to the members of other
religious faiths. And having established a work-week that favours Christians,
one can hardly object to exemptions for Muslims or Jews on the ground that
they violate the separation of state and ethnicity. These groups are simply
asking that their religious needs be taken into consideration in the same way
that the needs of Christians have always been taken in account. Public holidays
are another significant embarrassment for the ‘benign neglect’ view, and it is
interesting to note how rarely they are discussed in contemporary liberal
theory.55
It might be argued, by analogy, that normative criminal law standards, particularly
where manifested in the form of the ‘reasonable person’, are similarly ‘embarrassing’
and inadequate to deliver liberal justice. Just as public holidays were set at a time that
was ‘pre-diversity’ (in religious terms), so too were conceptions of legal normativity
set in an era of pre-diversity, in terms of ethnicity, culture and religion.56 A counter-
argument might be that unlike public holidays, which are ‘set in stone’ until such time
as they are changed by governments, normative criminal law standards are capable of
‘organic’ adaptation and evolution as they are operationalised in a diverse society.
However, the persuasiveness of the counter-argument depends on whether the
54 Ibid at 109.
55 Ibid at 114.
56 Of course, the silencing of women and Indigenous peoples in the construction of normative criminal
law standards cannot be explained in the same way.
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evolution of normative criminal law standards in a manner consistent with the
diversity of a society at any one time can be established.57
Will Kymlicka’s theoretical recipe for multicultural justice is not to salvage or
recast universality, but to legitimate recognition of differentiated legal rights based on
membership of a national minority or ethnic group. However, just as the case for
accommodation of diversity is made in the name of liberalism, so too are the
legitimate limits of differential rights — or, by extrapolation, differential criminal law
standards — set by liberalism. For Kymlicka, any claim for the value of cultural
diversity is also made within an overall framework of liberalism: “liberal goals are
achieved in and through a liberalized societal culture or nation”.58 In a similar vein,
Bhikhu Parekh has suggested that the ideal multicultural society “is committed to both
liberalism and multiculturalism, privileges neither, and moderates the logic of one
with that of the other”.59 However, Kymlicka, it would appear, ascribes a dominant
role to liberalism in this relationship. Put simply, “The demands of some groups
exceed what liberalism can accept. Liberal democracies can accommodate and
embrace many forms of cultural diversity, but not all.”60 For Kymlicka, the primary
limits is that the rules/standards/values of the minority group cannot be ‘anti-liberal’.
Kymlicka anticipates the argument that this approach suggests that “reconciling
minority rights with liberalism is a Pyrrhic victory”:
If the members of a minority lose the ability to enforce religious orthodoxy or
traditional gender roles, have they not lost part of the raison d’être for
57 The limits of Kymlicka’s ‘equality argument’ are defined to a certain extent by the existence of
disadvantage, which is susceptible to redress by the granting of special rights to national minorities,
and whether the rights are sought by polyethnic groups or national minorities – a structural difference
with important theoretical consequences for Kymlicka. Kymlicka makes an important distinction
between what he describes as “the two main sources of cultural pluralism” (Kymlicka, supra note 40 at
239), or elsewhere, as “patterns of cultural diversity” (Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 10). Multination
states are constituted by more than one culture, marked by distinct language, shared history and sense
of nation and people. Typically, a state resulting from the invasion and colonisation of territory
occupied by Indigenous peoples would be described as a multination state, and the Indigenous nations
as ‘national minorities’ or ‘minority cultures’ (Kymlicka, supra note 40 at 239). By way of
differentiation, a polyethnic state is one marked by extensive immigration of people of diverse cultures.
Kymlicka notes that such individuals, while allowed to maintain much of their ethnic particularity, do
not constitute nations in the same way that Indigenous peoples do (ibid at 239). Post-colonial
multicultural societies such as Australia (and Canada and the USA_ are culturally diverse in both
senses. although there has long be debate about the relative claims of ongoing debate in legal and
cultural theory over the comparative claims of Indigenous Australians and those of immigrant
backgrounds: supra note 12.
58 Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 93.
59 B Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2000) at 340.
60 Kymlicka, supra note 39 at 152.
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maintaining themselves as a distinct society? Is the insistence on respect for
individual rights not a new version of the old ethnocentrism, found in Mill and
Marx, which sets the (liberal) majority culture as the standard to which
minorities must adhere?61
Kymlicka’s answer is that because liberalism is “grounded firmly in the value if
individual freedom” it is not acceptable to tolerate or legitimate practices, values,
standards or rules which restrict the autonomy of members of the group and deny
members the choice not to abide by those rules. Clearly then, an approach to the
adoption of differentiated normative criminal law standards based on the
ethnicity/cultural membership of the accused and/or victim which was underpinned by
Kymlicka’s multicultural liberalism would eschew absolute cultural relativism in
favour of a preliminary evaluation of the proposed standard in terms of its
compatibility with the liberal principles of autonomy and tolerance. It might be
anticipated that, under such a system of scrutiny, the prospects for success of a claim
for the application of a differential standard would depend to a considerable extent on
the degree of correlation with the dominant standard.
4. Legal Pluralism and “Orderly Difference”62
Merry has described the evolution of the concept of legal pluralism as follows:
The intellectual odyssey of the concept of legal pluralism moves from the
discovery of indigenous forms of law among remote African villagers and New
Guinea tribesmen to debates concerning the pluralistic qualities of law under
advanced capitalism. In the last decade, the concept of legal pluralism has been
applied to the study of social and legal ordering in urban industrial societies,
primarily the United States, Britain, and France. Indeed, given a sufficiently
broad definition of the term legal system, virtually every society is legally
plural, whether or not it has a colonial past. Legal pluralism is a central theme in
the reconceptualization of the law/society relation.63
Within this process of evolution and development, Merry identifies two phases of
legal pluralism. The first, “classic legal pluralism”, was concerned with “the analysis
61 Ibid at 153.
62 The overview of legal pluralism which begins this section draws on work previously published in L
McNamara, “The Locus of Decision-Making Authority in Circle Sentencing: The Significance of
Criteria and Guidelines” (2000) 18 The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 60 at 67-69.
63 S Merry, “Legal Pluralism” (1988) Law and Society Review 869 at 869; see also D Manderson,
“Beyond the Provincial: Space, Aesthetics, and Modernist Legal Theory” (1996) 20 Melbourne
University Law Review 1048 at 1059.
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of the intersections of indigenous and European law” in colonial and post-colonial
contexts. The second, “new legal pluralism”, espouses that “plural normative orders
are found in virtually all societies”.64
The features of the concept of legal pluralism have been variously explained in the
literature. Manderson has succinctly stated that “In its simplest form, legal pluralism
posits that more than one legal order inhabits the same physical territory”.65
According to Merry legal pluralism is “generally defined as a situation in which two
or more legal systems coexists in the same social field. ... Recent work defines ‘legal
system’ broadly to include the system of courts and judges supported by the state as
well as nonlegal forms of normative ordering. ... Thus, virtually every society is
legally plural.”66 In a similar vein Griffiths has observed that “Legal pluralism is an
attribute of a social field and not of ‘law’ or of a ‘legal system’. ... It is when in a
social field more than one source of ‘law’, more than one ‘legal order’, is observable,
that the social order of that field can be said to exhibit legal pluralism. ... [L]egal
pluralism is a universal feature of social organization.”67
Sack has emphasised that legal pluralism has a strong ideological dimension:
“Legal pluralism is more than the acceptance of a plurality of law; it sees this plurality
as a positive force to be utilised—and controlled—rather than eliminated.”68 In these
terms, legal pluralism is not a neutral anthropological lens, but a standpoint from
which to challenge the ideology of “legal centralism”. According to Griffiths, legal
pluralism aims to
break the stranglehold of the idea that what law is, is a single, unified and
exclusive hierarchical normative ordering depending from the power of the
state, and of the illusion that the legal world actually looks the way such a
conception requires it to look.69
It may be considered to follow that this version of legal pluralism (sometimes referred
to as “social science” legal pluralism) is positively antagonistic towards the idea of
state law (or elements thereof, such as normative criminal law standards) being
64 Merry, supra note 63 at 872.
65 Manderson, supra note 63 at 1059.
66 Merry, supra note 63 at 871.
67 John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1at 38.
68 Peter Sack, “Legal Pluralism: Introductory Comments” in Peter Sack and Elizabeth Minchin (eds),
Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII (Canberra: Law Department,
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1988), 1.
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adjusted so as to accommodate polyethnicity and cultural diversity — not because of
a lack of sympathy or support for difference, but out of a concern that law reform of
this sort perpetuates ‘legal centrism’. And yet there is a danger in this stance of
separating the ‘concept’ from its political traditions and potential. As Manderson has
observed, “The first stage of ‘modern pluralism’ was motivated by a clear political
agenda ... Whether in colonial societies, Brazil or the inner city, ‘pluralism’ stood for
resistance to the established legal order.70 The social science version of legal
pluralism tends to under-emphasise this factor — deliberately, it would seem, but
nonetheless problematically.71 As Alan Hunt has observed, while it is important to
“recognize the diversity of legal phenomena and avoid falling into the presumption of
a unitary entity “the Law”, it is also important “to give due recognition to the
importance of both the state as a political agency and to state-law.”72 More
specifically, Hunt has emphasised the need to “address the specific articulation
between state-law and non-state law”.73
The identification and application of differential normative criminal law
standards might be assisted by the insights offered by legal pluralism: that it is both
empirically established and legitimate that there are multiple sets of rules or
normative orders in a polytechnic society. Surya Prakash Sinha has expressly
affirmed the empirical and aspirational features of legal pluralism (or “legal
polycentricity”) as follows:
Legal polycentricity accepts the pluralism of moral values. Therefore, it
conceives the problem of legal relationships in terms of relations among various
normative orders within a legal system and seeks their recognition within that
legal system. ... It is interested in discovering modes of allocation of decision-
making authority that would maximise the coexistence of these normative
orders.”74
However, as one moves from the empirical to the political, from observation to
advocacy of reform, and to the specific terrain of normative legal standards, an
69 Griffiths, supra note 67 at 4-5.
70 Manderson, supra note 63 at 1060.
71 Thanks to Paul Havemann for first prompting this insight.
72 Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law (New York:
Routledge, 1993) at 307.
73 Ibid at 323.
74 Sinha, supra note 31 at 47, 48.
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apparent dilemma emerges. In Legal Pluralism: Toward a Multicultural Conception
of Law, Warwick Tie expresses the tension as follows:
A problem emerges ... that threatens to limit legal pluralism’s capacity to
provide a basis for theorising the conditions of a multicultural law. The problem
concerns an incommensurability that exists between the goal of recognising
socio-legal diversity and the construction of universalisable standards of legal
judgement, so necessary for shared social life. ... The amalgamation of socio-
legal diversity and universal standards of legal judgement is a conceptually
difficult, if not impossible, enterprise.75
In part 2 of this paper I identified two possible strategies for addressing the potential
injustice associated with the cultural bias of normative criminal law standards: (a) the
(re)construction of a multicultural or ‘non-white’ universality; or (b) the adoption of
differential or multiple normative standards which reflect the diversity of a polyethnic
society. The intractable “incommensurability” identified by Tie arises specifically
because he pursues the former alone. However, the goal is, arguably, incompatible
with a legal pluralist orientation, particularly in light of legal pluralism's opposition to
legal centrism.
Legal pluralism, like Kymlicka’s multicultural liberalism, would appear to more
comfortably and logically support the differential normative standards approach,
given its central tenet that there exist multiple normative orders in any one ‘social
field’. However, as with Kymlicka’s liberalism, legal pluralism sets limits on the
accommodation of cultural difference. Drawing on the work of Robert Cover,76 Sarat
and Berkowitz, have described those limits:
First, difference must arise out of and express the normative aspirations of an
integrated and ordered community — it must exemplify and express a “nomos”.
In this sense, Cover’s legal pluralism embraces the liberal celebration of
multiplicity, but in a way that insists that the claims of difference be linked to
the requisites of richly constituted, normatively engaged orderliness.
Second, claims of difference should be honored only when they themselves
honor the principle of difference they assert. ... Legal pluralism does not require
that those of us sympathetic to the claims of cultural difference stand by as all
manner of horrors are committed in its name. We can, and should, insist that
difference be orderly, even as we invite questions about what order entails. And
75 Warwick Tie, Legal Pluralism: Toward a Multicultural Conception of Law (1999) at 162, 167.
76 Robert Cover, “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4.
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we can, and should, insist that the claims of “equal but different” honor
principles of equality and of difference.77
For Sarat and Berkowitz, the value of legal pluralism, reflected in these conditions, is
that it “departs from entrenched discourse and lays the groundwork for a much needed
reconciliation of difference and order.”78
Like Kymlicka’s expectation that anti-liberal rules or practices would be a
barrier to legally recognised differentiated citizenship rights in relation to those rules
or practices, the conditions set by Sarat and Berkowitz for an accommodation of
cultural difference founded on legal pluralism are substantial. This, of course, does
not necessarily make them improper. However, it is important to recognise that many
minority cultural communities in countries like Australia, Canada and the USA may
fail to satisfy even the first condition, precisely because their experiences as ethnic or
Indigenous ‘others’ may militate against the continuity and cohesiveness necessary
for the expression of a nomos. In this way, the historical hostility to cultural difference
and the associated pressures to “assimilate” may serve to (re)produce the normativity
of dominant cultural values and practices and perpetuate the marginalisation of ethnic
minorities.
The challenge may be even greater when one considers that, even where a
decision-maker is ‘open’ to claims based on cultural diversity, that person’s limited
training and expertise is likely to heavily influence how they approach the task. As
Marie Deveney has observed, “... the decision maker’s understanding of what
constitutes ‘cultural distinctiveness’ is crucial, for it can strongly influence the
outcome of the accommodation question.” 79 Deveney suggests that
A common, seemingly predominant, notion of cultural distinctiveness is ...:
Cultural distinctiveness which might warrant accommodation exists only where
members of the dominant culture find easily perceived manifestations of the
minority culture both to be starkly different from their own and to be essentially
unchanged from a time which the dominant culture associates with the
‘authentic’ minority culture.80
77 Sarat & Berkowitz, supra note 28 at 314-315.
78 Ibid at 315.
79 See Marie Deveney, “Courts and Cultural Distinctiveness” (1992) 25 University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 867.
80 Ibid at 869.
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Assertions as to the dynamic nature of culture and cultural values are likely to clash
with judicial expectations of predictability81 and certainty in the setting of normative
criminal laws standards.
5. Critical Race Theory and Confronting Whiteness: The (Re)construction of
Multicultural Universality?
Mention of the impact and significance of the historical experience of minority
cultures provides a convenient segue to an examination of critical race theory (CRT)
perspectives relevant to the application of normative criminal law standards. A
defining feature of CRT is its awareness of the contemporary relevance of histories of
racial oppression. In a significant work which describes and advances the features and
aspirations of CRT, Angela Harris quotes from Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic82
to “succinctly state a now-familiar critique of the liberal legal language of objectivity
and neutrality”,83 which is especially apt to highlight the potential of CRT to inform
an examination of the operation of normative criminal law standards in polyethnic
societies:
Long ago, empowered actors and speakers enshrined their meanings,
preferences, and views of the world into the common culture and language.
Now, deliberation within that language, purporting always to be neutral and fair,
inexorably produces results that reflect their interests.84
Challenges to the liberal orthodoxies have come from a variety of disciplinary,
political and philosophical perspectives, but what has distinguished CRT is that CRT
scholars “have questioned concepts of neutrality and objectivity… from a perspective
that places racial oppression at the center of analysis and privileges the racial
subject”.85 A major theme, then, of CRT scholarship is a concern with the “ways in
which assumptions about race affect the players within the legal system… and have a
determining effect on substantive legal doctrines”.86 Racism is understood not “as an
81 Ibid at 876.
82 R Delgado and J Stefancic, “Hateful Speech. Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of ‘A Just
Balance’ Changes So Slowly” (1994) 82 California Law Review 851.
83 Harris, supra note 27 at 742.
84 Cited ibid. See also G. Torres, “Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal and the
Hope of Pluralist Justice” (1991) 75(3) Minnesota Law Review 993.
85 Harris, supra note 27 at 750.
86 D Litowitz, “Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory” (1997) 72 Notre Dame Law Review
503 at 503-504.
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intentional, isolated, individual phenomenon, equivalent to prejudice”87 but as “a
structural flaw in our society.”88 CRT supports both exposure/critique of the “deeper
structure that reflects white privilege” beneath the surface of race-neutrality,89 and, at
least at its most optimistic, reform of the rules, values and practices by which
‘whiteness’ is manifested as ‘universal’.
For Harris, what distinguishes CRT from “traditional civil rights scholarship”
(such as might, in the Australian context, be seen as embodied in the Australian law
Reform Commission’s Multiculturalism and the Law, discussed above) is a rejection
of the view that solutions can be found in “the old optimistic faith in reason, truth,
blind justice, and neutrality”:90
History has shown that racism can coexist happily with formal commitments to
objectivity, neutrality, and colorblindness. Perhaps what CRT needs is simply a
redoubled effort to reach true objectivity and neutrality. But, then again, perhaps
those concepts themselves need reexamination.91
For Harris, CRT supports a “jurisprudence of reconstruction” which involves a
“project of ‘writing back’ to white dominated legal rules, reasoning, and
institutions.”92 Harris argues that CRT scholars need not shy away from the pressures
which “impels legal scholars to take the law as their client” and to “propose solutions
that can be implemented within the exiting legal system”, so long as this occurs while
keeping in mind “the larger political and economic context of law professing as race-
crits continue their theory building.” 93
The concept of “whiteness” has emerged as a powerful motif of the insights
and concerns of CRT and allied critical perspectives. As Cheryl Harris has observed:
The law masks what is chosen as natural; it obscures the consequences of social
selection as inevitable. The result is that the distortions in social relations are
immunized from truly effective intervention, because the existing inequities are
obscured and rendered nearly invisible. The existing state of affairs is
considered neutral.94
87 Harris, supra note 27 at 752.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid at 754.
90 Ibid at 759.
91 Ibid at 759.
92 Ibid at 765.
93 Ibid at 779.
94 C Harris, “Whiteness as Property” (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1709 at 1777-1778.
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Margaret Davies has observed that the fact that “critical reflection about the practical
consequences and normative association of whiteness” is a relatively recent
phenomenon is testament to “[t]he power (and invisibility) of the white norm”.95
Warren Montag has stated that “in its most historically effective forms, whiteness
does not speak its own name.”96
The identification and interrogation of “whiteness” is a simple and effective
rebuff to the claimed neutrality of the law generally, and race-neutral decision-making
in particular.97 It seems intuitively relevant to a critical evaluation of the operation of
including normative criminal law standards in culturally diverse and increasingly
‘non-white’ societies like Australia. Critiques of whiteness do not offers parameters
for the accommodation of cultural diversity in the construction and application of
normative standards, in the same way that limits cane be gleaned from Kymlicka’s
multicultural liberalism, or legal pluralism. So where do its insights lead?
To the extent that whiteness is understand as a set of cultural values (amongst
many sets in a polyethnic ‘multi-coloured’ society) the goal may be seen as breaking
the nexus between whiteness and universality, or by concluding that universality is
beyond redemption and should be abandoned in favour of differential normative
standards. And yet, the very act of recognising and accommodating difference (for
example, in the construction and deployment of differential normative standards
based on ethnicity) may serve to reinforce the privileging of whiteness, but reserving
for ‘white’ decision-makers the authority to define the differentiated identity, whether
favourably or unfavourably.98
In any event, it is simplistic to regard whiteness as merely one among many
sets of cultural values. Joel Olson has argued that “whiteness historically has not been
an expression of culture so much as a social status reflecting relations of inequality,
95 M Davies, Asking the Law Question: The Dissolution of Legal Theory (2nd ed, 2002) at 281.
96 W Montag, “The Universalization of Whiteness: Racism and Enlightenment” in M Hill (ed),
Whiteness: A Critical Reader (1997) 281 at 290.
97 See Barbara Flagg, “‘Was Blind But Now I See’: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement
of Discriminatory Intent” (1993) 91 Michigan Law Review 953.
98 See Neil Gotanda, “Tales of Two Judges: Joyce Karlin in People v Soon Ja Du; Lance Ito in People
v OJ Simpson” in Wahneema Lubiano (ed), The House That Race Built (Vintage Books, 1998) 66 at
71-72.
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discrimination, privilege, and terror”.99 Having cast whiteness as “an identity of
power, not of culture”100 it is not surprising that Olson concludes that the solution is
to “neither ... ignore nor redefine white personhood but to abolish it.”101 For Olson,
the goal is not a “colorblind personhood” or a “multicultural personhood”, but an
“anti-white personhood” or “abolitionist personality”.102 Olson’s abolitionist
personality is, in effect, a new universality, which is characterised by opposition to
white privilege, a “new core set of values” based on “Black culture”, and a
fundamentally political identity which eschews superiority and commits to “freedom
of all”.103 A complete interrogation of the potential of Olson’s remedy is not possible
here, but its “Utopian”104 nature may make it difficult to translate into identified legal
and political strategies. In addition, consideration would need to be given to whether
it has currency in a country such as Australia, given that it is conceived with specific
reference to the history and politics of the USA.
6. Conclusions: The Multiculturalisation of Criminal Law Normativity
This paper has not attempted to ‘rank’ the various theoretical perspectives discussed
in term of their degree of ‘diversity friendliness’. Rather, the indicia of legitimate
multicultural law reform identified in this paper, drawn from (multicultural)
liberalism, legal pluralism, critical race theory and critiques of whiteness, provide
valuable reference points and criteria for assessing both the processes and outcomes
of efforts to accommodate (or not accommodate) claims based on cultural diversity.105
99 Joel Olson, “The Limits of Colorblind and Multicultural Personhood” (2001) 2 Stanford Agora: An
Online Journal of Legal Perspectives 1.
100 Ibid at 16.
101 Ibid at 18.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid at 21.
104 Ibid at 19.
105 Although my own research currently focuses on criminal justice decision-making, the challenge of
interrogating of normativity, arising in many other (non-criminal law) legal decision-making contexts,
particularly, as Simpson and Charlesworth have observed, given that legislation is increasingly framed
in a way which relies on “open-ended standards, requiring officials to decide, for example, what is in
the ‘public interest’ or what is ‘reasonable in the circumstances”: G Simpson and H Charlesworth,
“Objecting to Objectivity” in Rosemary Hunter, Richard Ingleby and Richard Johnstone, Thinking
About Law: Perspectives on the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Law (1995) 86 at 103.
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More specifically, they offer a discourse for interrogating and critically evaluating the
(conscious and unconscious) parameters within which criminal justice decision-
makers approach the task of adjudicating in cases where claims are advanced on the
basis of the defendant’s Aboriginality, ethnicity, or religion.
Of the two primary accommodation strategies identified in this paper —
namely, the adoption of multiple differential normative standards; and the
(re)construction of a single multicultural normativity — the former is the approach
which would appear to flow most logically from an application of Kymlicka’s brand
of multicultural liberalism or the concept of legal pluralism deployed by Sarat and
Berkowitz. And yet, the preconditions set for the distinct cultural community —
including adherence to values of autonomy, tolerance, equality, difference, as well as
internal order and integration — will, even if adopted in the criminal justice decision-
making context, represent a high threshold that will be practically unattainable for
most ethnic groups, although it may be satisfied by some Indigenous communities.
The latter alternative — a reconstructed multicultural normativity —
intuitively generates even greater scepticism, because, although not necessarily
theoretically implausible, it seems politically naive. And yet, critical race theory
demonstrates that critique and scepticism is not necessarily incompatible with
practical legislative and judicial attempts to uncouple whiteness and racism from
‘universal’ criminal law standards. To this end, meaningful scrutiny of the potential
for the imagined reconstruction to be achieved must involve examination of the day-
to-day decision-making events that constitute the negotiation of diversity and
authoritative normativity. Revelation of the full implications of multiculturalism for
the legitimacy of criminal law values and standards will be facilitated by
consideration of the agency of criminal justice decision-makers — including police
officers, prosecutors, defence lawyers, magistrates, judges and juries.
